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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
_ [. 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Respondent,: 
• 
vs. : 
i 
LEONARD G. MILLER, : Prior 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 860347-CA 
fty No. 2 
of a second-degree This appeal i s from convic t ions 
felony and two third-degree f e l o n i e s in Third D i s t r i c t Court. 
This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1987) . 
£IAT£$2EHI_Q£_I£SI2£5| 
1 . Was defendant denied h i s r ignt to a speedy t r i a l 
due to the f i v e month delay between h i s arrest and t r i a l where 
both defendant and the State were responsible for port ions ot the 
delay and where defendant did not a s s e r t h i s r ight to a speedy 
t r i a l u n t i l after t r i a l ? 
2 . Did tne t r i a l court suoject defendant to douole 
jeopardy when i t reversed i t s order dismissing the aggravated 
assau l t charge where the d i sorder ly conduct 
defendant previously pled g u i l t y did not arj; 
conduct as the aggravated as sau l t charge? 
charge to which 
i s e out of the same 
£XAX£tlfillX-fiE-Xfi£-CA&£ 
Defendant, Leonard G. M i l l e r , was charged with 
aggravated robbery, a f i r s t - d e g r e e f e lony , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978); or in the a l t e r n a t i v e , r e t a i l the f t 
while armed with a deadly weapon, a second-degree f e lony , in 
v i o l a t i o n ot Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (1978); and aggravated 
a s s a u l t , a third-degree f e lony , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103 (1978); and possess ion of a dangerous weapon by a 
r e s t r i c t e d person, a third-degree f e lony , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1978) . Defendant was convicted of the 
r e t a i l t h e f t , aggravated as sau l t and weapon possess ion charges by 
the court s i t t i n g without a jury on May 7 , 1986 in the Third 
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, in and for Sa l t Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Judith M. B i l l i n g s pres id ing . Judge B i l l i n g s 
sentenced defendant on May 30 , 19 86, to one terra ot 1 to 15 years 
and 2 terras ot 0 to 5 years to run concurrent ly . 
SimMfiflLflEJEACM 
The charges in t h i s case arose out of an inc ident at a 
Food-For-Less s tore at 1500 West 3500 South, in West Valley City 
on December 4 , 1985 (R. 79 -80 ) . Defendant walked out ot the 
s tore that day carrying a case ot beer and a carton of c i g a r e t t e s 
without paying for them (R. 81-82)• An employee, David Bennion, 
followed defendant from the s tore and requested h i s r e c e i p t (R. 
82)• When defendant held up a piece of paper that looked 
crumpled and did not look l i k e a Food-For-Less r e c e i p t but would 
not g ive i t up for inspec t ion , Mr. Bennion asked defendant to 
return to the s tore and point out the cashier who had taken 
defendant's money (R. 83) . 
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•r,. ion attempted *~ - ,*1 ' 
defendant by ,-. ai :, * .nside ** ^t,>re Defendant 
ber r. down a',; placed the beer and ~% v * *-
u.. i. - rturne.: • 
standing position • - - ^-ir- r. releasee defenaan1 -
.;: because he saw the knife 
i . ij^ienuant r e t u r n s the knit* * ^L~ b::eau and Mr. 
Bennu i yi\. * - * ••' merchandise. 
£ nn returned to the store f defenaant called 
after hi: * . Defendant admitted taking the merchandisef 
said he wa? - t t ing him 
5 iennion retutnea v. t^ *r - , enlisted the help 
ci -trier employees and returned outsi ie LU IOOK tr • ' 
found defenda /^.^ t-ander na,, i-dnu.^: 
defendant's 1 icense plate nuiiir-v, a-: ; -ennion passed it on 
Otti er Simpsc *\ l--r**: arrested defenia 
87 , , u c i u i jcteriUdiit waif 
a parolee ~ • ^  . .-t bupervision ; •-, Probation and Paiuie
 x**. 
112) . 
assaul*" " . • • * . . . v J ead ly weapor ,e 
number >•: ;- * - m Decemt- n 
i - . H o n nf t -*.•-- d e f e n d a n t wdb 
LI anspor t ed * / a l l e y - •.r/u,**^*
 t>> ' i s s d o l - . i te l 
t n c i ' ' - » . The West va .... . 
] 9BL« a l Je t jea t h a t d e f e n d a n t a s s a u l t e d DavL t ' - \ - -\ r November 
9, 1985 at 1476 West Parkway (R. 9) . It did not allege use of a 
weapon. 
Defendant appeared before Judge Billings in case number 
CR85-16 92 on January 31 19 86 and moved to dismiss the aggravated 
assault charge on David Bennion (R. 117) . The grounds alleged 
for dismissal were that he had pled guilty to disorderly conduct, 
a lesser-included offense of the simple assault charge, in the 
West Valley City case. Defendant asserted that the West Valley 
City charge grew out of the December 4 shoplifting incident. 
Judge Billings, accepting defendant's assertion, apparently 
dismissed the aggravated assault charge (R. 144) •1 
Prior to the dismissal, on January 7, 1986, the State 
had refiled, under a new information, the present case adding the 
charge in Count Three and the alternate charge in Count One (R. 
125, 131) • Because this case included an aggravated assault 
charge, Judge Noel refused to bind defendant over on that charge 
until the State moved for reconsideration ot the dismissal by 
Judge Billings (R. 131-132). Judge Billings reconsidered the 
order of dismissal on April 2, 1986 and reversed (R. 146). The 
basis for the court's reversal was that the West Valley City case 
arose from a separate incident occurring on a different day than 
the Food-For-Less incident and upon a different victim. Judge 
Billings recommended that defendant seek to withdraw his guilty 
plea in the West Valley case since defendant said he believed at 
1
 While there is no order of dismissal appearing in the record 
on appeal, Judge Billings refers to her ruling in the transcript 
ot the State's Motion to Reconsider dated April 2, 1986 at R. 
144-145. 
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t h e t ime 1 ie was p,l ec i r o^ a r i s i n g from, the 
Pood -F lor- L e s s i n c i d e n t * 
adoptee L, _. ,. jpien^- Court , d e t e n d a n t was not d en i ed a 
s p e e i y t r . ^ I - ive-month dt i * In i mi I t- J m i l I m l 
was ^ u - - aJ ^- « r 
defendant •;«
 t -t ut i .^ n a r q e s d i s m i s s e d 
e m o e _ s , fendant * a s s e r f . ."--:i -:-<** 
. j u d i c e c 
1,1, hu t enda . * AJS n t s u b j e c t e r - i ^ :-
when t h e t r i a l cour* i ** _ , . ; ^ . o S a u i t 
, ; -. d i s m i s s e s *_. , e r r o n e o u s 
f a c t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i l e l e n ^ . 4 - s -
gui l< ' * . . tccuci 
. . . . c iden - t c d u s e 3 e r e ' . : a : * a-•• . 3 . ^ p led g u i l t y to 
o f f e n s e t h a t , as v n a r g e d , was a f^ r^uax iiy 
s h o p ! * . ^ c i d e ^ : < Noveir.re: ~ 
1 9 8 5 , p lead g u i l t ; i .•.*£- i .nc i . i>-« - i f e ^ - ^ t h e 
Decembe; j . •• * 
i <• \ m i s s a l . 
ASSSHSIS 
FIVE MONTHS DELAY BETWEEN ARREST 
AND TRIAL DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT 
HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 
Defendan t was a r r e s t e d on Decerabe i \\ IN rinn i i.im.ij ueif 
Hi t U b t U - ^ •~f end ant a s s e r t s 
t ha t t h i s delay denied him his r i gh t to a speedy t r i a l . He 
requests t h i s Court to reverse his convict ions and order 
dismissal of the charges as the only remedy for his alleged 
pre judice . 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the B3iJssi_YjL_JJiB9fir 
407 U.S. 514 (1972) , t e s t for determining whether a defendant has 
been denied h i s r i gh t to a speedy t r i a l . Sia.t£_YjL_fiS£aaa9 
P.2d , Case No. 20779 s l i p op. a t 6 (Utah decided June 17, 
1987) • The E^tJSfil t e s t requi res balancing of the conduct of both 
the prosecution and the defendant. I d . There are four fac tors 
tha t must be weighed: length of delay, reason for delay, 
defendant 's asse r t ion of the r i g h t , and prejudice to defendant 
resu l t ing from delay . I d . Application of these fac tors to t h i s 
case reveals that defendant 's speedy t r i a l r igh t was not 
infr inged. 
F i r s t , the length of the delay in t h i s case was not 
ex t raordinary . While Utah Code Ann. SS 77-l-6(f) and (h) (1982) 
provides a 30-day time l imi t for t r i a l ot incarcerated 
ind iv idua l s , tha t time period i s d i r ec to ry , not mandatory. ££a£e 
XjL-.hQZailSi9 462 P.2d 710 (Utah 1979) • Moreover, the delay in t h i s 
case cannot be wholly a t t r i bu t ed to the State as defendant 
a s s e r t s . 
In t h i s case , defendant was t r i ed f ive months af ter his 
a r r e s t . While there i s nothing in the record to indica te the 
or ig ina l t r i a l d a t e , defendant s t a t e s tha t i t was se t for 
February 13, 1986* This t r i a l date was outside the 30-day period 
mentioned in SS 77-1-6(f) and (h ) , yet defendant does not claim 
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t h a t life t i n o . While a w a 1 ' ^ — *._.-•. ^ 
however , de iendan~ - , me t i e r s n s n r a s s t*v. a s s a u l t cnai ;e 
i: jr . i 4 . . i n f o r m a t i o n . uudge B 
t h e mot "• 
u c i c u J a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e d e , ;if ^CJ-« 
a t t r i b u t e . - » . * . - . ^ c r a - ' c r w- - s i 
. i a e t e n d u . v ;•• ^unfuse * . 
d i s m i s s , ; r K S J U I ' *: j r j e .-. , ; , A i c a s e and b e c a u s e the 
p r o s e c u t * i iT-^nrj*.-* *•!-« <— , ^ npw 
- , ^ ^ h u pi e,. u r ana ry ne~ : 
Utah s^t,^t< v J; • f however , r e c e n t i . u - - . - ]d a c o n v i c t i o n 
o b t a i n e d - - J : ? ai * ami tin: d e f e n d a n t 
\ . ..--.• d i s p u t e which r e q u i r e c d e t e r m i n a t i o n p r i o r 
t* * - ** * ia i£_ i r « * ^ « , . * - J . Defen: ; 
c a s f u e d a s s a u i ; ^harnc *...: 
L r a c t s t h a t were i n c o r r e c u ' : i t l a t e a L \ iv t : 
a rgued in P o i n t M MM inn, ii|i> Wt it . . * 
based i - , - s c a D e tnc o r r e r s t 
d c s . a . t . , , - - i n f o r m a t i o n , thoug: -lie same 
v i c t . i n d a n t ' s mot ion tu e 
I - _ ormat-ionc _ ^ _ ^ ._, <_
 s a f f i e c t i e n s t * 
Because t h i . war : . . a . ^ ? de fendan t cannot t*-*r : r i i te t h e 
d e l a y o c c a s i o n e a ; -e 
d i s m i s s a l ^ 
D e t e n a a n t n - t e i u : i * t * •• i r * •- - r r , * ; ,he 
S t a t e ' s s e c - - L . (Jays 
- *. « i u i e u i e t e n d a n t ' .\ ::.. ; . * i . j i s m i s s . 
- 7 -
This is a very short time period which indicates the State's 
desire to move the case forward in a timely manner. 
While, defendant urges the Court to weigh heavily 
against the State the delay that occurred when Judge Noel would 
not issue the bind-over order on the second State's information 
until the State sought reversal of Judge Billings1 dismissal 
which was erroneously granted to begin with, the State should not 
be charged with this time period where defendant obtained the 
dismissal erroneously* 
Judge Billings reversed her order of dismissal on April 
2 and Judge Noel bound defendant over on the new intormation on 
April 3. Again, there seems to be no undue delay in a one-day 
gap between these two actions by the lower courts. 
Defendant was tried on May 5, only 32 days atter he was 
bound over on the information that forms the basis for this case 
and 5 months after arrest. This is not an unreasonable amount of 
delay between arrest and trial. See ££aJtfi_Y_KniJLlr 6 56 P.2d 
1026, 1029 (Utah 1982) (3J$ montns between arrest and trial not 
violation of right to speedy trial). 
Defendant insists that the State should be charged with 
the delay in his case because defendant chooses to characterize 
the reason for the delay as the State's attempting to overcharge 
defendant with robbery. Defendant ignores the fact that a third 
charge was added which was possession of a weapon by a restricted 
person. Therefore/ adding the alternative robbery charge was not 
the "primary" reason for the new preliminary hearing as defenaant 
alleges. The prosecutor also noted to Judge Billings that the 
-8-
second information had already been f i l e d at the time the motion 
to dismiss was heard on January 31 (R. 125) . And, in f a c t , the 
new information i s dated January 7 , 1986 (R. 2 0 ) . I t i s l i k e l y , 
therefore , that had defendant not erroneously convinced the t r i a l 
court to dismiss the assau l t charge, the State would not have 
waited for the outcome of that motion to proceed to preliminary 
hearing on the second information* I t was defendant's motion 
that delayed h i s t r i a l rather than the prosecutor f s dec i s ion to 
r e f i i e the charges . Under these circumstances, defendant 
indicated h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to temporarily waive h i s r ight to a 
speedy t r i a l . ASSAM* s l i p op. at 5 c i i i n a S£3i£_Xx_Y£-US211£Z# 
641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982); aM fififi S-taJtS-JU-ksDUSI# 717 P.2d 1325, 
1329 (Utah 1986) . 
As for the third f a c t o r , defendant never asserted h i s 
r ight to a speedy t r i a l . While a defendant 
the r ight has not waived i t , the f a i l u r e must be balanced against 
the other f a c t o r s . fissaflSr s l i p op. at 6, 
who f a i l s to as ser t 
Defendant claims he 
asserted the r ight at t r i a l , however, he c e r t a i n l y did not ask 
e ly pointed out tnat 
erroneous est imate ot 
the t r i a l court to dismiss the c a s e . He meiq< 
he had been incarcerated for s i x months (an 
the actual time) (R. 7 6 ) . 
F i n a l l y , defendant argues that he Uas prejudiced by the 
five-month delay because i t w i l l s u b s t a n t i a l l y lengthen h i s 
sentence as the Board of Pardons does not grant c r e d i t for 
p r e t r i a l incarcerat ion . There are three i n t e r e s t s to consider in 
the area ot prejudice: "(1) preventing oppressive p r e t r i a l 
incarcera t ion , (2) minimizing anxiety and concern ot the accused; 
- 9 -
(3) and l i m i t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y that the defense would be 
impaired•" QssaMf s l i p op. at 6. Here, defendant does not 
a l l e g e that h i s defense was impaired but s t a t e s only that f i v e 
month's p r e t r i a l incarcerat ion i s oppressive and that he sutfered 
anxiety and concern. 
While any length of incarcerat ion i s l i k e l y to produce 
anxiety and concern in most people f the f i v e months incarcerat ion 
here does not seem overly oppress ive . The Utah Supreme Court has 
upheld cases where a defendant was incarcerated for 3% months, 
££ajfcS-2A_Kllill9 656 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1982) , and for 12 montns, 
Siaifi^^A-fiSDDfit9 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) . In SannS! the Court 
noted that the s i gn i f i cance of the length of incarcerat ion was 
reduced where defendant acted to delay the t r i a l as did defendant 
here . 717 P.2d at 1330. 
Defendant a l so i n s i s t s that the Board of Pardons does 
not grant c r e d i t for p r e - t r i a l incarcerat ion . In support, he 
provides an outdated Pol icy No. A09/12. Attached in Appendix A 
i s a copy of Pol icy No. 4 .06 , the current Board po l i cy on the 
i s s u e . C lear ly , the Board does grant c r e d i t for p r e - t r i a l 
incarcerat ion where appropriate. Defendants argument on t h i s 
point i s consequently without meri t . 
Because defendant's t r i a l was delayed only f i ve months 
from h i s arres t and because he was responsible for a portion of 
the de lay , f a i l e d to a s s e r t h i s speedy t r i a l r ight and suffered 
l i t t l e , i t any, pre judice , detendant i s not e n t i t l e d to dismissed 
of the charges for lack of a speedy t r i a l . 
- 1 0 -
POIHT II 
REVERSAL OF THE ORDER DISMISSING 
THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CHARGE DID 
NOT PLACE DEFENDANT IN DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY 
The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy 
bars: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the ^ame offense after 
conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense* 
fi±A±£-X.tJ2X££f 671 P.2d 142, 146 (Utah 1983); HflttlLXlaiLfillnaJtj 
EeatSfir 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Defendant urdes this Court to 
reverse his conviction for aggravated assault under the second 
scenario listed above because, he alleges, 
convicted for a lesser-included disorderly 
same offense. The outline of facts presented below illustrates 
he was previously 
conduct charge for the 
at he is not entitled that defendant's allegation is wrong and th< 
to reversal ot the aggravated assault charg 
The information filed in West Valley City alleged that 
defendant assaulted David Bennion on November 9, 19 85 at 1476 
West Parkway (R#9). The complainant was Detective S. Coxey. The 
information tiled in this case alleged that defendant assaulted 
David Bennion on December 4, 1985 at 1500 West 3500 South while 
armed with a knife (R. 19)• The supporting 
as Simpson, Fluckinger, Paul Jacobsen, Davidj 
and Kevin Kenna. Both informations referred! 
number 85-29842. 
witnesses were listed 
Bennion, Ted Elder 
to police report 
The State proffered to the trial cburt that the West 
Valley case arose from a fight between defendant and Ralph 
Robinson on November 9, 1985 at 1476 West Parkway (R. 135)• 
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Somehow, after defendant was arrested tor the Food-For-Less 
incident, someone obtained the police report for that incident 
and used information from it along with the citation from the 
Robinson fight to prepare the information for the November 9 
fight. The Robinson fight is described in police report number 
850277 81 and resulted in both persons receiving a citation (R. 6-
8). The result was that the West Valley City information did not 
match either incident but was a hybrid including facts from both 
crimes. 
Defendant argues that because he thought he was 
pleading guilty to a lesser otfense in the Food-For-Less assault, 
he could not be tried for the assault in the instant case because 
it created double jeopardy. On the contrary, however, the facts 
in the West Valley information do not describe the same offense 
as that alleged in the information in this case. Though the 
victim^ name was the same, the date and address were difterent. 
Thus, even it this Court chooses, or the trial court had chosen, 
to ignore the State's proffer that the victim in the West Valley 
case should have been stated as Ralph Robinson, the offenses are 
still not the same offense for purposes ot douoie jeopardy 
analysis. 
Defendant may well have a valid reason to witndraw his 
guilty plea in the West Valley case due to the errors which 
caused him to be confused about the crime to which he pled guilty 
there. That complaint, nevertheless, does not affect the 
validity of his prosecution and conviction in this case and his 
conviction here should be atfirmed. 
-12-
deny Defendant's The State requests this Court to 
request for dismissal ot the charges for lack ot a speedy trial, 
to deny his request for reversal of his conviction of aggravated 
robbery for a violation of the Double JeopArdy Clause and to 
atfirm defendant's convictions on all three counts. 
DATED this _Z2*L- day of ^^^fc^l i 19 87. 
DAVID L. W LKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
/^IANDRA L7~JK5SREJQ "~~ 
^ Ass i s tant Attorney General 
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Uhlhim-Q&BXlZLQhXS 
I hereby c e r t i f y that on the OJli. day of J u l y , 1987, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and exact 
cop ies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT to each 
ot the fol lowing counsel ot record: 
Edward K. Brass 
321 South 600 East 
Sal t Lake C i ty , Utah 84111 
l^t&d£A££$Qfe 
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UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS I 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 
Number: 4.06 Date: July 14, 1986 Page 1 of 2 
Title: SENTENCE EXPIRATION 
Authority: Utah Code Annotated 76-3-202 
Utah Code Annotated 77-3 5-21.5 
Attorney General's Opinion dated Octok >r 26, 1978 
Purpose: To establish the Board of Pardons' policy on the calculation and 
extension of sentence expiration dates. 
Policy: It is the policy of the Board of Pardons to calculate sentence 
expiration dates from the date the commitment order was signed 
by the judge, tolling any time that an offender was an escapee 
or was a parole violator and not in Utah custody, and crediting 
any time that an offender was incarcerated prior to commitment 
unless it was as a result of absconding while on bail, 
probation, or on his own recognizance, or a condition of 
probation. T 
Original Issue Date: 
54 51C 
Revision Date: 04-06-87 
Number: 4.06 Date: July 14, 1986 Page 2 of 2 
Procedure: The following periods of time shall be credited toward an 
offender's expiration of sentence: any time served as an inmate 
on the initial commitment or for any parole revocation; any time 
served at the State Hospital pursuant to a "guilty and mentally 
ill" conviction; up to 180 days served on diagnostic 
commitments; any time served prior to commitment unless it was a 
result of absconding while on bail, probation, or on his own 
recognizance, or a condition of probation; any other time 
granted by the Board in accordance with the policy on Credit for 
Time Served, #2.05, and any time served on parole. Expiration 
dates shall be extended by the amount of time that an offender 
is a parole violator but is not in custody in Utah. That time 
shall be determined to be from the date a Board of Pardons 
warrant was issued to the date the offender was returned to Utah 
custody. An offender is determined to be a parole violator when 
his parole is subsequently revoked by the Board. 
On anything less than a life sentence, the sentence expiration 
date shall be the date the judge signed the commitment order, 
plus the maximum number of years in the sentence, minus one 
day. This is to reflect that the sentence expires at midnight 
on that day. 
Sentence expiration dates shall be reflected on orders of parole 
and disposition forms, and noted in reports to Board members by 
Board staff. 
Upon expiration of sentence, the Board of Pardons shall be 
notified in writing. Upon verification of that information, the 
Board will then order the closing of the file. 
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